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Abstract

A theoretical and empirical innovation of the household production model is
the appearance of wages in demand functions.

However, creating reasonable

econometric instruments for wages is difficult under any circumstances and is
particularly troublesome when using data from developing countries, where the
prevalence of nonmarket production means that few observations on wages are
usually available.

In this paper, alternative strategies for creating

value-of-time instruments are discussed in detail and, using cross-sectional
data from the Philippines, competing methods are implemented and compared.

The

major finding is that the theory and procedure of correcting for selection bias
can substantially improve wage instruments.

INTRODUCTION
Demand equations derived from the household production model--which
focuses on productive activities in the home, human capital, the opportunity
cost of time, and prices as determinants of household resource allocation
decisions--have been used increasingly to explain household behavior in
developing countries.

The model's emphasis on time allocation and the price

of time, a quantity and a price that are absent from standard consumer demand
models, is a theoretical innovation that has improved our understanding of
many family-level decisions that have a distinct economic content, including
those pertaining to fertility, health, nutrition, labor supply, education,
migration, and agricultural production.
source of an empirical burden:

However, that innovation is also the

the need to create reasonable measures of time

prices.
Unlike the price of homogeneous commodities, the price of time is
intimately linked to individual human characteristics and is therefore
difficult to measure as a purely exogenous variable.

Using individual wage

rates to measure the value of time, which would capture the heterogeneous
nature of labor, is made difficult by the fact that wages are generally
observed only for people who work in market jobs.

In developing countries,

where there are high levels of self employment, wide use of unpaid family
labor in income-producin g activities, and substantial reliance on home
production for consumption needs, wages are rarely observed.

Many strategies

have been followed to estimate wages in the face of this problem, including
reliance on community wage rates, simple and complex regressions to create
wage instruments, estimates of both wage offers and reservation wages, and
begging the question altogether by dropping value-of-time variables.
One of the advantages of regression methods is that they facilitate
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detection and correction of selection bias, which is potentially a serious
problem in samples for which few wage observations are available.

There is

little regard in the literature, however, for statistical problems that are
inherent in the selection-correction procedure and almost no knowledge of the
effect of selection bias on wage predictions and the performance of wage
instruments in demand equations.
This paper discusses alternative methods for estimating the value of time
for married women in a developing country context, bringing together different
strands of the literature that help to structure the exercise.

A model is

outlined in the next section that demonstrates why wage estimates are
necessary and how theory helps to specify the solution to the wage-estimating
problem.

Then the literature is examined to point out how empirical solutions

differ.

Finally, wage and earnings estimates are presented for a sample of

Philippine women, and conclusions are drawn about competing wage estimation
approaches.

MODEL
The form of a typical but simplified household production model and its
implications are illustrated below.

Suppose a household maximizes the

following concave utility function:

U = U(C,L.)
i

(1)

C = a vector of home-produced commodities, such as
nutrition, health, child quality, or number of
children
L. - leisure of the ith household member (i=l, ... ,n)
C, L: ~ 0
i

Each commodity is produced in the home using purchases of market goods and
household members' time, with positive but decreasing marginal productivity of
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inputs:
C = f(X, TH. ;E)

(2)

1.

X = a vector of market-purchased goods used to produce
each element in C, per unit of C
TH.= home time of the ith household member used to produce
l.
each C, per unit of C
E - fixed components of household technology such as
skills or home capital goods
Leisure is modeled as a decreasing function of the two alternatives:
L.

1.

h(TM., TH. ;T)
1.

(3)

1.

TM. = market work of the ith family member
1.
T. - total time available
1.

h' < 0
The household is limited in its goods purchases by pecuniary and time
constraints that define the standard linear full-income constraint:
(p'X

+ ~.TH.)C + ~.L.
1.

1.

1. 1.

~

Y +~.(TM.+ TH.)
1.

1.

(4)

1.

p - price vector of market inputs
Y = nonlabor household income
w. - market wage rate of ith family member
1.

The household's problem is therefore to maximize the Lagrangean:
i = U[f(X,TH;E), h(TM,TH;T)] + A[Y +~(TH+ TM) - (p'X + ~TH)C - wL]
in which, for notational simplicity, the subscripts have been dropped.

(5)

The

maximization problem yields the following first-order conditions:

ai

ax

~~

~i

ai
8TM

~~ ~~M

ai
8TH

~~

ai
8A

ApC

~

0, X

~

0, and

x[~i]

(6)

= 0
0

+AW~ 0, TM~ 0, and TM[~iM]

~iH +

~~ ~~H

+ AW - AwC

~

0, TH~ 0, and TH[~iH]

Y +~(TH+ TM) - (p'X + ~TH)C - wL

~

0, A~ 0, and A

(7)

0

(8)

[aa~]
A

0

(9)

Because the utility function is assumed to be concave in its arguments, the
second-order conditions for a maximum are satisfied, and optimal values of the
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endogenous variables can be expressed as implicit functions of the exogenous
variables.

The following reduced-form demand equations for goods, time, and

commodities can be written:
X = X(p,w,Y;E)

(10)

TM.= TM.(p,w,Y;E)

(11)

TH.= TH.(p,w,Y;E)

(12)

C = C(p,w,Y;E)

(13)

1
1

1
1

In this exposition, knowledge of T, TM, and TH at the optimum for each family
member fixes the residual demand for leisure (L).

Equations (10) through (13)

imply that values of the endogenous variables are jointly determined by
prices, wages, nonlabor income, and household technology.
In empirical work, any one of these reduced-form equations can be
estimated independently, with unbiased coefficients.

However, any such

undertaking requires exogenous values for prices (p) and wages (w).

Community

prices and wages are natural choices because they are arguably determined in
the market at a level that is beyond the influence of household decisions.
However, if analysts desire wage estimates that more explicitly take into
account individual characteristics, a set of problems is created that can be
illustrated using the first-order conditions.
One or more family members are likely to work at home and not in the
market, so there will be many situations in which a corner solution is chosen
for equation (7) but an interior solution is chosen for equation (8), giving
rise to the following inequality:
au ah
au af
au ah
~m<_a_f_a_T~H_+_a_h_a_T_H
w
w(l
C)

(14)

At the most obvious level, equation (14) indicates that the decision to
stay out of the labor market is not a random event.

For the person who works
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at home but not in the market, the value to the household of the last hour
devoted to home work is greater than the value of devoting that hour to market
work.

If equation (14) is slightly modified so that the "price" of work is

W, the wage offer, and the "price" of work at home is W, the reservation
o
r
wage, we have the following:
---

au ah
ah aTM

af 8TH + ah 8TH

w0

W (1-C)

au af

au ah

(14a)

r

For given utility and production functions, there is some combination of a
wage offer and a reservation wage at which the two sides of the equation are
equal and the household is just indifferent to this member's moving from TM=O
to working in the market.
W = W = w.
r
o

For that person and anyone who works in the market,

For an individual who does not work in the market, equation

(14a) implies that W > W.
r
o
The value of li necessary to equalize the two sides depends on both the
utility and production functions.

The marginal valuation of hours devoted to

market work depends only on the labor-leisure choice (the utility function),
while the marginal valuation of nonmarket work depends on both the
labor-leisure choice and marginal productivity in nonmarket activities.
Variables that affect productivity at home, such as land and business
holdings, do not affect productivity in the market. 2
To extend this line of reasoning to wages, the implication is that market
wage offers, which are determined by characteristics that affect market
productivity, are not affected by a number of variables that do, however,

2

This approach assumes, of course, that productivity in the market and
productivity in the home are not both affected by the same variables. The
efficiency wage literature is concerned directly with this issue. See Bliss
and Stern (1978) for the conditions under which such an assumption would hold.
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affect reservation wages through the marginal productivity of nonmarket work.
This distinction can be pursued in empirical work to create restrictions which
allow identification of the coefficients in the wage offer and reservation
wage equations.

STRATEGIES FOR ESTIMATING THE OPPORTUNITY COST OF TIME
Researchers cannot avoid predicting wages, even if most of the sample
reports wages.

Errors in measurement, unobserved on-the-job training effects,

and faulty observations on hours can all be transmitted to the wage variable,
requiring some sort of instrumental variable estimation technique if wages are
to be used as independent variables in other regressions (Schultz, 1980).
Consequently, a decision must be made about creating proxies for R·
Following is a list of alternative strategies with citations for studies using
each technique:
(1)

Use a community wage rate obtained from another survey,
create a community wage by averaging reported wages from
the sample being used, or ask a community leader to
estimate a market wage rate (Khandker, 1985).

(2)

Drop those observations for which the wage is missing
(Grossman, 1972).

(3)

Instead of using a wage variable, use highly correlated
variables (age, race, ethnicity, education) as
substitutes for wages in a reduced form demand equation
(Akin et al., 1985).

(4)

Estimate a wage function for people who report wages, then
use the estimated coefficients to create a wage
instrument for the entire sample (Smith, 1981; McCabe and
Rosenzweig, 1976).

(5)

Realizing that observations on wages are not randomly
missing, use the procedure in (4) after correcting for
possible sample selection bias (Anderson, 1982).

The first alternative (a community wage rate) has some desirable
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features.

It is exogenous to the household and, relative to a predicted wage,

collinearity between the wage variable and other household- or
individual-level regressors is probably reduced.

For historical series,

community or national wage averages trace general movements in wage rates
(Schultz, 1985).
The principal drawback of the community wage strategy is that it discards
information about the effects on wages of individuals' human capital
investments, such as training and education.

A common argument in favor of

community wages is that the only alternative to work at home for rural women
is work as agricultural laborers, so a community-level agricultural wage
adequately captures the opportunity cost to them of working at home.

However,

a number of studies (Rosenzweig, 1984; Anderson and Leiserson, 1980) have
demonstrated that labor markets in rural areas of low-income countries are
well developed and that the return to human capital investments can be quite
high.

It is unlikely under any circumstances that highly educated women face

the same wage offers as uneducated women or that they are equally productive
outside the market.
The second approach (dropping observations with missing wages) is
difficult to defend.

If only a few observations are eliminated and wage data

are randomly missing, the loss of information only reduces the efficiency of
parameter estimates.

If observations are discarded nonrandomly, which would

be the expectation given the theory outlined above, the sample is transformed
from a censored sample into a truncated sample.
The third option (using proxies) at least retains the whole sample, but
it is difficult to imagine a proxy for wages that should not itself appear in
demand equations.

The fourth approach (OLS without a selection correction)
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has been used in the past to avoid problems caused by the other procedures.
However, the literature on selection bias has established that if those who
work in the market are systematically different from nonworkers in terms of
unmeasured characteristics that affect wages (such as innate ability or desire
to participate in the market), this procedure generates inconsistent parameter
estimates for the wage equation.
Through the utility maximization process discussed earlier, households or
individuals formulate a reservation wage (W ), which is the wage at which they
r
are indifferent between supplying hours to the market or staying at home.
Similarly, people face a demand signal, or wage offer (W ), from the market.
0

The supply and demand functions are shown below as linear equations (Heckman,
1974, 1976, 1979; Schultz, 1980):

w0

(15)

wr

(16)
H = hours of market work,
Z, X - overlapping vectors of explanatory variables, and
c , c = jointly normal errors with zero mean and covariance
1
2
matrix:

If a =0 and hours adjust to equate W and W, the probability of working is
1
o
r
given by F(Q), where Fis the normal distribution function and Q is shown
below.

3

3

The assumption that a =0 simply means that the household or individual
1
faces a perfectly elastic demand curve for labor hours--the usual assumption
that any number of hours can be supplied at the market wage. The following
definitions apply to equation (17):
c = (c

2

- c )/a

1

c

9

,

ao

,

+ a2Z -

Po -

P2X

Q = ---------

a

(17)

e

The population means of the two dependent variables are given by the following
equations:
E(W

0

le

(18)

:SQ)

(19)

v1

and

v2

are residuals with E(Vi)=O.

The f(Q)/F(Q) and f(Q)/1-F(Q) terms

correct the residuals for truncation, and their coefficients measure the
covariance between the errors in the participation equation and the respective
wage equation.

Using the fourth (simple least squares) procedure to create

wage estimates fails to incorporate the selection term in equation (18),
wrongly forcing a e=O and thus biasing the remaining coefficients.

1

Using the fifth (selection-correcting) procedure to estimate wages has
many desirable characteristics.

It allows wage offers to be affected by human

capital variables, retains the whole sample, creates unbiased parameter
estimates in the wage function, allows estimation of reservation wages, and
avoids combining wage effects into other regressors.

Equation (18) can be

estimated by maximum likelihood; alternatively, Heckman and others have
developed two-step procedures that are widely used.

4

The two-step probit (based on the normal error distribution) has been
adapted to a logit-based model (Weibull distribution) by Hay (1980) and Lee
(1983), and to the linear probability model (uniform distribution) by Olsen
(1980a). In another paper, Olsen (1980b) offers a statistically inconsistent
least squares approximation to the Heckman maximum likelihood method. In
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Equations (18) and (19) provide unbiased estimates of the population
means of W and W, but these means are conditional on working and not
o
r
working, respectively.
of time for everyone?

How can a researcher predict a single opportunity cost
One obvious strategy is to predict a market wage for

workers from equation (18) and a reservation wage for nonworkers from equation
(19), conditional on prior knowledge about whether they work in the market.

A

second and more common approach is to predict a market wage for everyone from
equation (18), but that procedure creates a wage estimate for nonworkers
conditional on their working in the market, which is counterfactual.
A third strategy is to predict an unconditional wage offer for the whole
sample, which is an average weighted by the probability of working in the
market:

le

s Q)]F(Q) + [E(W0

le

> Q)][l-F(Q)], or

E(W)

[E(W

E(W)

a F(Q) + a Z[F(Q)] - a £f(Q).
0
1

0

0

0

(20)

2

(21)

Equation (21) is based on the fact that the observed wage offer is zero for
nonworkers; hence, its expectation is zero (Maddala, 1983).

STATISTICAL COMPLICATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH SELECTION BIAS CORRECTIONS
Substantial research has been devoted to detecting selectivity bias and
to technical aspects of the various correction procedures.

A gap exists,

however, between theorists, who have been concerned with consistency and
efficiency of parameter estimates, and users of the selection model, who have

still another paper, Olsen (1982) demonstrates a maximum likelihood estimator
that allows for skewed convolutions of the normal distribution. For
applications of the probit procedure see Maddala (1983). For an example of
the logit procedure see Blau (1981); for the Olsen linear probability
procedure see Pitt and Rosenzweig (1985); and for the Olsen nonnormal
estimator see Anderson (1982).
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been primarily interested in prediction.

Two shortcomings of the literature

are a lack of regard for econometric problems caused by the selection
correction method and little knowledge of its impact on wage predictions.

For

researchers interested in simply creating a wage instrument, it is an open
question whether correcting for selectivity bias has a strong enough effect on
wage predictions to make the associated statistical costs worthwhile.

The

remainder of this section is devoted to discussing statistical problems that
may be introduced by the selection correction.
Validity of Selection Rules
In any sample, values of the dependent variable may be missing due to
nonreporting by individuals who participate in the labor market.

There is a

strong temptation to suspect that other selection rules cause nonreporting and
to compensate for them in order to fill in the missing values.

Unless there

is a theoretical reason to expect nonreporting to be systematically
determined, however, the OLS residuals should not be truncated.

The potential

for identification problems and multicollinearity resulting from multiple
selection criteria (discussed below) dictate that trivial selection rules be
avoided.

5

Nonnormality of Errors
It is so common in research to assume that random variables are drawn

5

One study (Behrman et al., 1980) estimates wages for a sample of
Nicaraguan women, 46 percent of whom participate in the labor force. About 8
percent of the workers do not report wages. The authors posit a sequential
decision-making process in which the women first decide whether to work, then
decide whether to report earnings. However, no theoretical reasoning
justifies why failure to report earnings is other than a random event, so it
is difficult to justify the choice of variables that explain reporting. None
of the coefficients for variables chosen to explain nonreporting is
significantly different from zero, and selection on reporting is not
statistically significant in the wage equations.
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from normal populations that few analysts are likely to be troubled by the
assumption that the errors in equations (15) and (16) have a bivariate normal
distribution.

However, detection of selection bias actually depends on a

truly normal error distribution appearing to be nonnormal because of
truncation.

If the errors appear to be nonnormal because they actually come

from a nonnormal distribution, selection bias may be inferred when it is not
the problem (Olsen, 1982).
The recent literature has explored the sensitivity of the selection
correction to nonnormality.

Goldberger (1983), through a simulation exercise,

shows that the Tobit model is sensitive to departures from normality to a
degree that is positively related to the amount of truncation.

Olsen (1982)

tests for selectivity bias in wage estimates for teenagers under the
alternative assumptions of normal and nonnormal errors.

He finds that the

underlying distribution is probably nonnormal but that selection is
statistically significant--an d the estimated coefficients similar--under
either assumption about the errors.
Anderson (1982) describes similar results for wage estimates for a sample
of Guatemalan men.

She compares wage instruments estimated three different

ways--least squares, selection correction assuming normally distributed
errors, and selection correction under the assumption of nonnormal errors.
The estimated wage elasticities in a fertility demand equation are nearly
identical for wage instruments created using either least squares or
selection-corre cted coefficients, but correcting for nonnormal errors
increases the elasticity nearly four-fold.

Anderson concludes that selection

bias is less important for her sample than are nonnormal errors.

The Olsen

and Anderson studies suggest that nonnormal errors may not strongly affect the

13
detection of selection bias or estimated coefficients, but Anderson's findings
show that the effects may not be entirely neutral when the point is to create
wage instruments in demand equations.
Identification
This is a simultaneous equations model, yet little attention is usually
paid to identification.

If the parameters of the offered wage equation (18)

are estimated using the working subsample, the selection effect can be
A

identified if the matrix [Z

A

f(Q)/F(Q)] is full rank.

This result is

guaranteed if the participation equation is estimated by probit or logit
A

A

A

because even if Zand the determinants of Qare identical, f(Q)/F(Q) is a
A

nonlinear function of Q and will not be perfectly collinear with Z.
Researchers often rely on the nonlinearities implicit in the estimation method
·
to i d enti. fy t h e wage coe ff.i cients.
0

6

If the full model represented by

equations (18) and (19) is estimated, recovering the coefficients of the
reservation wage equation requires,that at least one variable in Z be excluded
from X.

Alternatively, a

12

=0 can be assumed.

Any approach contains an

element of arbitrariness.
Multicollinearity
A

A

Because [f(Q)/F(Q)] is a nonlinear function of variables that appear in
both Zand X, if nonlinear terms are incorrectly excluded from Z (such as the
square of experience), their nonlinear effects may be picked up by the
selection term in the wage equation (Olsen 1980a).

The coefficient on the

selection term might therefore be incorrectly judged to be statistically
6

In the linear probability model, however, identification requires that
at least one regressor appearing in the participation equation be excluded
from the wage offer equation (Olsen, 1980a). If there is more than one
selection criterion and the criteria are sequential, identification requires
additional exclusionary restrictions (Behrman et al., 1980).
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significant when it is actually picking up the effects of excluded nonlinear
terms.

Moreover, as the presence of nonlinear and interaction terms in Z

increases, the potential for multicollinear ity between those regressors and
the selection correction term rises Olsen (1980a).

Multiple selection

criteria exacerbate this problem; the same variables are likely to enter the
different selection rules and the wage equation.
Two-Stage versus Full Maximum Likelihood
Although the popular two-step probit/OLS selection correction procedure
produces consistent estimates of the coefficients of the wage equation, the
efficiency gains in using the full information maximum likelihood alternative
can be substantial, and other problems (such as incorrect t-statistics) are
avoided (Wales and Woodland 1980).

Does efficiency matter?

Monte Carlo experiments seems to be resoundingly positive.

The answer from
Under conditions

most likely to prevail in empirical work--considera ble overlap among exogenous
variables in the selection criterion and those in the wage equation--the
precision of the two-step estimator declines sharply.

The maximum likelihood

estimator, in contrast, is insensitive to this type of correlation if there is
selection bias.
between e

1

and e

In addition, its precision increases as the covariance
2

in equations 15 and 16 goes up, which is what we are trying

to measure (Nelson 1984).

The more serious is the selectivity problem, the

more important efficiency becomes, so the two-step estimator is least
desirable under exactly the conditions that prompt its use.
This review suggests that while the problems caused by not correcting for
selectivity when it actually exists are well understood, the complications
resulting from the correction itself may also be serious.

The performance of

different estimating procedures in creating wage instruments is consequently
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an important consideration.

ESTIMATION
The goal of the empirical work is to implement and evaluate the various
wage estimation methods using a single set of data.

The data come from the

first panel of the Bicol Multipurpose Survey, which includes 1,903 households
and their 12,000 residents in the Bicol region of the Philippines (Popkin and
Roco, 1979).

The sample is reduced for this work to 1,688 households (89

percent of the total) for which both husband and wife were present in 1978.
There are three elements of the economic environment that cause problems
for creating value-of-time estimates.

One element is diversity of human

capital formation and employment opportunities.

In the Bicol sample, 78

percent of the married women had a primary education or less, 10 percent had
done some high school work, and 12 percent had completed high school (half of
whom--6 percent--had gone on to college).

This dichotomy between a mass of

women with little schooling and a small number of highly educated women is
reflected in the working subsample's occupations.

About 78 percent were

employed in low-skilled jobs (petty trading, handicraft-making, and farm
labor) for which wage offers might be adequately approximated by a
community-level agricultural wage, while 8 percent worked as school teachers
or in administrative and clerical positions.

A community or agricultural wage

would not capture offered wages for these "outliers" with substantial
schooling and modern sector jobs, nor would it capture differences in
productivity at home that are due to variation in human capital.
A second element is diversity of economic activities.

In industrialized

economies, employment patterns can be specified in terms of particular jobs or
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professions.

In the Bicol region, as in other rural economies, there is

generally little specialization.

Three-fifths of the sample households were

agricultural in 1977, but almost all households, whether farm or not, raised
livestock and poultry.

Approximately 32 percent were engaged in two or more

separate economic activities (such as farming and trading), not counting wage
jobs.
The large variety of economic activities causes problems for both the
researcher and the women.

The researcher must sift out of this complex

information a summary measure of their opportunity cost of time.

The women,

who may be engaged in several different economic activities over a year's
time--as paid laborers, unpaid family workers, and unpaid but income-seeking
entrepreneurs--must give reasonable answers to a field worker who asks whether
they have an occupation, how much they earn, and how many hours they work.
The third environmental element is the large proportion of the sample (42
percent) who considered themselves to be primarily housewives.

Those women

were engaged in productive work that was not traded and therefore not valued
in the market; consequently, no information is reported on their value of time
or hours of work.

In fact, if those who did not work and those who worked but

did not report earnings are combined, earnings and wage observations are
missing for 70 percent of the women.
Creating a Community Wage Variable
Although the Bicol survey does not contain community-level wage data, it
does contain three different variables that can be used to create agricultural
wage averages:
(1)

What farmers paid per day for hired workers,

(2)

What farmers estimated as the replacement cost per day for
each family member who worked on the farm, and
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(3)

Daily wage rates for people who worked as farm laborers.

Averages are calculated across crops for each farmer, then these numbers are
7 d
. h"in communities,
. .
·
average d across f armers wit
eve 1 opment zones, or provinces.

Table 1 contains community wage averages for this sample. 8
Table 1 about here
Within each category of worker (men, women, and children), community
averages vary substantially by calculation method.

Although in farm work we

might expect men to be paid the most, women somewhat less, and children least,
this ordering is not maintained across all calculations.

There is, however,

close agreement between the average wage farmers reported paying hired workers
for cultivation (the top group of numbers in the table) and average estimated
replacement cost for family workers (the third group of numbers).

The

standard deviations for these two calculations are also similar and relatively
small.

For these reasons and because of relatively large sample sizes,

"estimated replacement cost for family workers" is the most likely choice for
a community wage variable.

Even so, 11 percent of the barangays have missing

values for women, and for the other 89 percent of the communities, wage
estimates are based on an average of only about six women each.

The average

daily wage for women in this sample is estimated to be 5.1 pesos per day by
this measure.
7

The survey contains 100 communities, 20 development zones, and 3
provinces. Each community contains about 20 sample households.
8

Additional difficulties become obvious when these calculations are
undertaken. Farmers pay different wages for different crops, they pay
differentially for cultivating relative to harvesting, and they use different
payment methods. Rice cultivators are generally paid by the day while
harvester/threshers are paid a share of the harvest.
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Specifying the Wage Function
Equations (15) and (16) require specification of the determinants of the
wage offer, Z, and the reservation wage, X.

Table 2 contains a list of the

variables chosen for analysis.
Table 2 about here
Wage offer.

The wage offer is a Mincer-type equation, where the

estimated coefficients measure the realized rate of return to human capital
investments in schooling and experience.

The standard proxy for experience,

age minus education minus 6, is used because it is an exogenous measure of
potential work experience.

The linear and quadratic terms allow for a

positive but diminishing return to additional years of experience.

Education

enters in the standard linear form as a proxy for human capital investments in
schooling (it is also, of course, an element in the experience calculation).
Variables are also included in the wage offer equation to control for
available opportunities.

City residence measures availability of market work

in the modern wage sector, which is concentrated in cities, and should have a
positive effect on wage offers.

Travel time from house to town center

controls for differences in infrastructure development.
Reservation wage.

City residence is excluded from the reservation wage

equation partially to help identify the coefficients but also because
differing labor market conditions in urban and rural areas do not affect
reservation wages or home productivity.

Transport time to the municipal

center is included because additional time required for traveling to carry out
home duties (such as marketing) should raise reservation wages (and lower
participation).
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"Husband's wage" should also appear as a regressor because if the wife is
a secondary worker, her husband's wage will raise her reservation wage.

There

are so few observations on men's wages for the same reasons that there are few
observations on women's wages that the determinants of the husband's offered
wage--experience and education--are included directly.

Husband's experience

and education should have positive effects on reservation wages and negative
effects on participation.
Similarly, nonlabor income--including rents, winnings from gambling,
pensions, interest, and gifts--should raise the reservation wage and reduce
the probability of participating.

Agricultural land and business ownership

measure land and capital assets that raise productivity in nonmarket
activities and reduce the probability of participating in the labor market.
Asset holdings, such as the house, lot, and vehicles, are included as a proxy
for accumulated or endowed wealth and should negatively affect participation.
One important exclusion from the reservation wage equation is number of
children. Child-bearing and work decisions are closely related, and the number
of children at home is undoubtedly connected with the reservation wage.
However, child-bearing and labor market decisions simultaneously affect each
other, and it is rarely possible to include exogenous variables that identify
fertility from women's work decisions in a cross section.

Because one

important use of wage instruments is to estimate the response of fertility to
wages, wages must be estimated on the basis of variables that are exogenous to
both work and fertility decisions.
Labor market participation.

The decision rule governing participation in

the labor market is the difference between the explanatory variables in the
offered and reservation wage equations (equation 17).

Differentiating workers
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from nonworkers is, however, a treacherous task.

Women were asked their

occupations, their earnings if they worked, the number of hours worked in a
week, and the number of weeks worked during 1977.

Of 1686 women,

9

978

reported that they were" ... engaged in [some] type of occupational work in
1977" and named an occupation.

When asked if they were paid for their work,

515 out of 978 replied "yes" and reported earnings and hours.

For the 463 who

worked but did not get paid, there are no reported earnings, hence no wage
estimate.

The possible responses are organized schematically in figure 1.
Figure 1 about here

The main issue is what to do about the 463 women who claimed to work but
did not get paid.

One possible strategy is to follow the Behrman et al.

(1980) assumption that earnings responses are not randomly missing for working
women; instead, women decide whether to participate, then those who
participate decide whether to report earnings.
carefully define market workers.

An alternative is to more

If a woman worked but received no earnings,

the work was almost certainly carried out as an unpaid family laborer.

It

would be irrational to work without pay otherwise, so the only women who
should be counted as having market jobs are those who said they worked and
received remuneration.

In the terminology of the rural labor supply

literature, the underlying concern is with an off-farm labor supply function.
Wage Estimates

Table 3 reports results for the wage offer equation estimated three ways:
full information maximum likelihood for the selection model, the two-step

9

The sample of 1688 women has been reduced to 1686 because of missing
values for variables used in the analysis.
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(probit/OLS) selection procedure, and OLS without a selection correction.

The

two selection-corrected estimates depend on the participation equation, which
is also reported and will be discussed first.
The coefficient signs in the participation equation are generally as
expected.

Experience (the number of years since leaving school) has a

positive but decreasing effect on participation.

Woman's education raises the

probability of working in the market, but husband's education (and, pari
passu, his wage) reduces it.

Although the household's nonlabor income,

assets, and agricultural land holdings have the expected negative signs, they
are not statistically significant.
reduces participation.

Owning a business, however, significantly

Living in a city raises the probability of working,

but distance to a town has no discernable effect.
Table 3 about here
For the MLE wage equation, experience has a positive but decreasing
effect on wages that disappears for the average person in the sample at about
50 years of age.

Education has a strong positive effect on wages, with an 18

percent return to a additional schooling.

City residence increases wages, but

transport time has a slight positive effect as well:

living in a city raises

the average wage, but greater isolation also has a positive effect.

The

covariance across errors in the wage and participation equations (ale) is
highly significant, indicating that selection bias is important for this
sample.
Alternative Estimation Strategies:

Effects on the Coefficients.

A first

test of the different estimation methods is to compare coefficients across the
three wage equations reported in table 3.

The main difference is that the
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selection bias procedures (MLE and two-step) identify a stronger role for the
independent variables than does the simple 0LS equation.

The absolute

magnitude of the coefficients increases substantially in the consistent two
step estimate relative to the uncorrected 0LS estimates; they do the same
again under the efficient MLE procedure.

Relative to the uncorrected OLS

coefficients, for example, the slope for education increases by nearly 30
percent under MLE; for city residence, the coefficient increases by about 67
percent.

The MLE estimate shows a positive and slowly declining effect of

experience on wages that goes to zero at 43 years.

For the two-step approach,

experience has a positive effect on wages through 63 years (outside the
potential range of experience for most people); but the 0LS estimate detects
no effect of experience on wages.
The coefficient on the inverse of Mills' ratio (from equation 10:

a £)
1

is 59 percent larger in the MLE estimate as compared to the two-step estimate,
and it is far more precisely estimated.

In the 0LS estimate, the selection

coefficient is of course constrained to zero.

The gain in efficiency from the

MLE method is important for this sample, which is consistent with Nelson's
(1984) Monte Carlo experiment.

The coefficients are biased toward zero in the

simple 0LS procedure; moreover, although selection bias is strong, it is not
well detected by the two-stage method.
Interpreting the Effects of Selection.

The coefficients in the MLE

version suggest that if women were randomly picked out of the population and
given more schooling, their offered wages would rise about a third faster than
the already substantial effect estimated using a sample containing only those
women who already work.

Similarly, experience has a much stronger (although

decreasing) effect on wage offers once selectivity bias is corrected.

Women
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with more education and experience are more likely to select themselves into
the labor force; filtering out the participation effect isolates the true
effect of schooling and experience on market wage offers for randomly chosen
women.
Even though the effects of education and experience are enhanced by the
selection correction, a premium is also paid for unobserved characteristics of
women who are more likely to engage in market work.

The sign on the selection

· ·
l O in
· d icates
·
h
f or given
.
.
.
coe ff icient
tat
e ducation,
experience,
an d resi. d ence,
the mean of the offered wage is raised as the probability of participating in
market work increases.

This finding is consistent with the notion that women

who choose to engage in market work are relatively more productive there than
at home.

Table 4 about here
In table 4, the effect of the selection correction on predicted wages is
made clearer.

The first column of numbers shows the average of predicted

wages based on the MLE wage offer estimates, but without the selection term.
These numbers indicate that on the basis of experience, education, and
residence only, women in the working sample would be offered, on average, .18
pesos per hour; nonparticipants would receive average offers of .12 pesos.
When participation is added, the predicted wage offer goes up to 1.02 pesos
and .84 pesos, respectively.

For the average participant, the probability of

participating alone accounts for 82 percent of the wage offer.

10

Note that in estimating the wage offer equation (18), we are
estimating -a
as the coefficient on the selection-corre ction term. If the
1
estimated sign£on this term is negative, as it is in table 3, the total effect
of the selection term is positive.
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Table 4 also demonstrates how the high premium paid to participation
amplifies the error of estimating wage offers for nonparticipants as if they
were participants.

The final column, the "shadow value of time" is

constructed using the wage offer for participants [E(W

0

reservation wage for nonparticipants [E(W

r

le>

Q)].

le

:SQ)] and the

11

Figure 2 about here
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the log wage, both actual and
predicted, for the working subsample.
is relatively flat and wide.

The distribution of actual wage offers

The actual distribution is not necessarily the

true distribution of wage offers because there are so many possible problems
with the variable, as discussed earlier.

The OLS and MLE predictions have

almost identical distributions, tightly grouped around the mean except for a
skewed upper tail.

Judging only from this illustration, it appears that for

workers, correcting for selection bias has little impact on the distribution
of wage predictions.
It is interesting to note that the mean of the log hourly agricultural
wage (derived from a complex series of calculations based on data provided by
the husband) is strikingly similar to the mean of the regression-based
estimates (based on information from the wife about her own hours and
earnings).

As expected, however, the agricultural wage has a much tighter

distribution that fails especially to capture variations at the upper end of
the distribution.

11

An alternative would be to construct a wage offer for nonparticipants
given that they do not participate: E(W le> Q).
0
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Figure 3 about here
Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of the log of the OLS, MLE
(selection-corr ected), and community wage offers for the entire sample, along
with the log of the "shadow" value of time.

Although the similarity of the

OLS, MLE, and community wage distributions is maintained for the whole sample,
the predicted shadow value of time has a distribution that differs
significantly from the others.

Effects of Wage Instruments on Inferences in a Demand Estimate
Table 5 contains a simple Tobit estimate of the demand for modern
prenatal care by Bicolano women in 1977.

The equations contain the price of

prenatal visits at the closest public clinic or hospital, transport time from
the woman's barangay to the same facility, the value of household assets,
mother's age, urban/rural residence, mother's education, and mother's value of
time.

The estimated equations differ only in construction of the wage

variable.

The first contains no instrument for the value of time.

The others

contain, respectively, the community wage, OLS wage prediction, MLE wage
offer, and MLE shadow value of time.

A discussion of the demand model and

related policy issues can be found in Akin et al. (1985); we are only
interested in the effects of using different wage instruments. 12

12

Although identification of the wage instrument in the prenatal care
equation may be arbitrary, it is clearly identified by both the nonlinear
estimation procedure used to create it and by exclusionary restrictions in the
prenatal demand model.
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Table 5 about here
Generally speaking, adding a value-of-time instrument to the regression
containing no wage has little effect on most of the coefficients, a fortuitous
event in view of the assumed orthogonality of the regressors.

The price of a

visit and transport time both tend to reduce the number of prenatal visits.
Assets and living in a city tend to increase the number of visits.

Age has

little perceptible effect.
The community (or agricultural) and MLE wage instruments have negative
signs but are statistically insignificant.

The OLS instrument is

statistically significant and has a strongly negative effect on demand.
Despite the similar distributions of the MLE and OLS instruments, the two
methods must create substantially different wage estimates for specific women
in order to have such dissimilar impacts in this regression.

The final column

contains the shadow wage, which is assumed to be the correct measure of the
value of time.

The coefficient is negative and statistically significant at

the 89 percent level.
That the wage instruments are consistently negative in their effect on
demand suggests that time cost is a deterrent to women when they consider
whether to seek prenatal care.

The positive impacts of education and urban

residence on prenatal care demand tend to be underestimated in the absence of
a wage instrument, which suggests that the nonwage contribution of those
variables is biased downward by not accounting for the value of time.
If a value-of-time instrument were to be selected without the help of
theory; that is, solely on the basis of large t-statistics, the desired sign,
and large quantitative impact, the OLS instrument would be chosen in this
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case.

However, the correct way to measure value of time is using the shadow

wage; the OLS prediction is riddled with theoretical and statistical problems
that make choosing it an incorrect strategy.

The OLS instrument overestimates

by large magnitudes the absolute effects of both the wage and education
variables.

Although the community wage instrument represents a reasonable

estimation strategy, the lack of variation in that variable across individuals
reduces its ability to explain behavior.

CONCLUSION
There are many potential statistical problems associated with using a
selection-corrected wage instrument, apart from the fact that the procedure is
more complicated than possible alternatives.

For the Philippine sample

analyzed in this paper, however, correcting for selection bias has a number of
desirable effects:
1.

It provides a method to estimate wages that captures the
heterogeneous nature of both home and market workers. The
community wage performs poorly, as would be expected, in
capturing differences across individuals in productivity.

2.

Correlation across the errors in the wage offer and
participation equations is strong; consequently,
compensating for selection bias makes a large difference in
the coefficients of the wage-estimating equation. The added
efficiency of the MLE procedure improves the detection of
selection bias over the two-stage procedure. Although the
distribution of the resulting wage instrument does not
differ substantially from the OLS instrument, its impact in
the prenatal demand equation is quite different.

3.

The selection-correction procedure permits calculation of
reservation wages for those who do not work, which is
desirable on theoretical grounds. Using reservation wages
in combination with wage offers to construct a shadow value
of time for women not working in the market makes a
considerable difference in both the distribution of the wage
instrument and its performance in estimates of the prenatal
care demand equation.
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One advantage of combining the household production framework with
Heckman's statistical procedure is that theory helps to define restriction s
that allow identificat ion of coefficient s in both the reservation and offered
wage equations.

This procedure helps to make sense out of missing values that

might otherwise be the cause for multiple sample selection corrections .

The

resulting wage offer and reservation wage specificatio ns provide a simple
framework in which consideratio ns that have a distinct development economics
flavor (such as productivit y outside the market) logically enter the
reservation wage equation but do not also enter the wage offer equation.
The approach used in this paper is dependent on the assumption that
families that work agricultura l parcels or own businesses have opportuniti es
for productive work outside the labor market that are not readily available to
other households.

Decisions to farm or to run a business are partially

determined by offered wages; however, the relatively large fixed physical and
human capital assets necessary for farming or running a business are probably
safely taken as predetermin ed over the one-year period covered in the Bicol
survey.
Although the central purpose of this paper has been to examine different
methods of measuring the value of time for a sample in which only a small
percentage report wages, it is worthwhile to note the high return to education
estimated for the women.

The rate of return to additional schooling is about

18 percent in the selection-c orrected estimates of offered wages.

In the

reservation wage equation, the rate of return is about 5 percent.

Increased

schooling for women has--at least for this sample--the capability of raising
their productivit y both in the market and at home.

This is evidence that

additional investment in human capital can raise "full" incomes--th e ability
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to produce commodities either by buying inputs from the market or by producing
them at home--even if employment opportunities in the modern sector are slow
to materialize.
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Table 1.

Community Agricultural Daily Wage Averages, Bicol Region,
Philippines, 1978.

Method of Calculation

Men

Women

Children

Actually paid by farmer, all
crops--cultivat ion only
Mean (pesos per day)
Standard deviation
Number of people
Percent of communities

5.8
1.5
777
91

5.0
1. 2
496
81

4.4
1.2
129
44

Actually paid by farmer, all
crops--cultivat ion and harvesting
Mean (pesos per day)
Standard deviation
Number of people
Percent of communities

7.7
2.1
847
92

7.9
3.1
602
87

7.7
4.4
237
65

Estimated replacement cost for
family workers
Mean (pesos per day)
Standard deviation
Number of people
Percent of communities

6.3
1.3
1439
94

5.2
2.3
566
89

4.9
1. 7
410
74

Actually received by farm
workers
Mean (pesos per day)
Standard deviation
Number of people
Percent of communities

8.2
3.4
396
78

5.7
2.9
42
25

6.6
5.9
66
31

Source:

Bicol Multipurpose Survey, 1978.

Note:

Children are those less than 15 years old at the time of the survey;
they are not included in the other columns. "Number of people" is
the number contributing data to the calculation. "Percent of
communities" refers to the proportion of all communities for which a
community wage could be calculated. Not all communities had workers
in all categories.

Table 2.

Determinants of Wage Offers and Reservation Wages

Reservation Wage
Wage Offer
Overlapping
Experience
Experience squared
Education
City residence
Travel time to town
center

Experience
Experience squared
Education
Travel time to town
center

Identifying
Husband's experience
Husband's experience squared
Husband's education
Nonlabor income
Household assets
Land area owned
Whether family owns a
business

Table 3.

Labor Market Participation and Wage Estimates for Married Women, Bicol Region,
Philippines, 1978.

Column Definition:

Mean
(Standard
Deviation)

Participate,
report wage

Log
wage

Log
wage

Log
wage

Two
Step

OLS

Estimation method:

MLE 1

Mean of dependent variable

.297

-.231

-.231

-.231

-.740
(3.5)

-4.243
(9.4)

-2.698
(4.6)

-1. 682
(5.6)

Intercept

Reservation
wage
Calculated
from MLE

-2.705

Experience (years)

29.0
(14.5)

.035
(2.2)

.037
(1.9)

.021
( 1. 3)

.012
(0.7)

-.035

Experience squared

1051.7
(980.7)

-.0005
(2.1)

-.0004
(1.4)

-.0002

-.00001
(0.05)

.0005

(. 6)

6.5
(3. 7)

.061
(4.3)

.180
(7.9)

.155
(8.7)

.139
(8.7)

32.3
(15.0)

-.025
(1. 6)

.052

Husband's experience squared 1269.3
(1098.2)

.0003
(1. 5)

-.0006

Husband's education (years)

6.8
(3.8)

-.028
(2.4)

.056

7.8
(39.6)

-.0004

6088.4
(16923)

-.000003
(1.0)

Land area owned (hectares)

.96
(2.3)

-.018
( 1. 2)

.037

Family owns business or trade

.38
(. 49)

-.270
(5.0)

.562

Lives in city barangay

.15
(. 36)

.271
(2.9)

.564
(2.8)

.329
(2.1)

.192
(1. 3)

51. 4
(69.8)

-.0002

.002
(1. 6)

.002
(2.1)

.002
(2.2)

1.860
(20.9)

1.348

1.229
(31.6)

-1. 685
(14.2)

-.684
(2.0)

1686

105.7
17.9
.17
500

Education (years)
Husband's experience (years)

Net nonlabor income/100
Household assets

Time to town center (min.)
Standard Error (0 )
1
Covariance ( 01E:>

Chi-square (Likelihood ratio test)
F statistic
R-square
Sample size
1686
Notes:

.0008

( . 3)

( . 4)

.000006

83.4
1686

.052

.002
.881
( 02)

.394
( 0 2 E)

94.8
20.6
.16
500

The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics for the coefficient directly above except in
the first column, where they are standard deviations.
1 These two
columns come from a single maximum likelihood estimation for the full model.

Table 4.

Average Predicted Wage Offers and Reservation Wages for Workers and
Nonworkers

Type of Worker

Mean
Wage Offer
Without
Selection Term

Mean
Wage Offer
With
Selection Term

Mean
OLS
Wage
Offer

Mean
Shadow
Value of
Time

Participants in
the labor market

.18

1.02

.95

1.02

Nonparticipants

.12

.84

.76

.45

Note:

These numbers are estimated pesos per hour, not logs.
The estimates in the second column are based on equation 18, where
everyone is treated as if they worked [E(W le~ Q)], which is the way
wage offers are typically estimated but is 0 counterfactual for women who
are not working. We cannot say on the basis of this table that
nonparticipants should be working because their mean expected wage
offer (.84) is greater than their mean predicted reservation wage
(.45). Such a comparison would require estimating E(W le> Q) for
0
them.

Table 5.

Tobit Estimates for Number of Modern Prenatal Visits by Married, Pregnant Women--Using
Different Instruments for Value of Time. Bicol Region, Philippines, 1977.

Independent Variables

No wage

Community
wage

OLS
wage

MLE wage
offer

MLE Shadow
Value

Intercept

-3.6
(2.4)

-2.8
(1.5)

-5.4

(3.1)

-4.0
(2.5)

-4.1
(2.7)

Public clinic price

-.36
(1.7)

-0.4
( 1. 6)

-.28
( 1. 2)

-.33
(1.5)

-.32
( 1. 4)

Transport time to public

-.02
(2.8)

-.02
(2.9)

-.02
(1.9)

-.02
(2.5)

-.02
(2.6)

Value of household assets

.00
(2.3)

.00
(2.3)

.00
(2. 7)

.00
(2.3)

(2.8)

.03
(. 74)

0.03
(.73)

.07
( 1. 6)

(. 93)

.04
(1.0)

Live in city or town

1. 45
(2.3)

1. 38
(2.1)

1.66
(2.6)

1. 54
(2.4)

1. 55
(2.4)

Mother's education

.38
(4.2)

.38
(4.2)

.78
(3.5)

.46
(3.2)

.48
(4.4)

Mother's age

Agricultural wage

.04

.oo

-1.2
(.66)

OLS wage

-3.3
(2.0)

MLE wage offer

-.78
(. 74)

Shadow value of time

-1.2
(1.6)

Sigma

5.06
(20.9)

5.05
(20.9)

5.02
(20.9)

5.03
(20.9)

5.04
(20.9)

Sample size

507

507

507

507

507

Likelihood ratio test
(Chi-square 7 = 20.3)

66.8

67.2

70.76

67.4

69.4

Note:

Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses.

Figure 1.

Labor Market Participation and Earnings Responses, Bicol
Multipurpose Survey, 1978.

Any occupational work?

Earnings and Hours

Wage Variable

Report earnings/hours
515 ( 31 percent>

Actual wage
500 (30 percent)

Received no pay
463 (27 percent)

Missing wage
1186 (70 percent)

Worked
978 (58 percent>
No job
708 (42 percent)

Estimate earnings
678 (40 percent)

Note:

Wages are calculated by dividing annual earnings by annual hours.
There are 500 nonmissing observations on wages rather than 515 because
15 women who reported earnings did not report hours.

Figure 2

Distribution of Wage Offers f Or

\/',/r-J·
....

rkp, re:...,, ·•,_/

•._,I

·"'

Log Values

400

350

300

250
~

V

.D

E

200

::::!

z

150

100

50

o ~

r

.dl

-2.3821

-1 .8443 -1 .3065 -0.7687

D Actual Wage
Offer

Note:

\,
+ O1S

Wage
Offer
Prediction

-0.2309

0.3069

Wage
Offer
Prediction

◊MLE

fr;:

0.8448

~
1 .3826

1 .9204

6. Community or
Agricultural
Wage [The daily
rate divided by 8)
The numbers on the X-axis are the lower boundary of the relevant range, so the points
on the graph lie above the left boundary rather than the midpoint.

Figure 3
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